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THE MENOMINEE INDIANS: TERMINATION
TO RESTORATION
Stephen J. Herzberg*
Part I
Introduction
This is the second of two works in which the major withdrawal
programs of the 1950's-termination and Public Law 280-are
studied in the context of a history of the Menominee Tribe of
Wisconsin. The reason for this approach is set forth in the in-
troduction to the first piece:
The passage by Congress of the Menominee Restoration
Act of 1973 constitutes a significant and in some respects a
dramatic reversal of American Indian policy. By thus repeal-
ing the Menominee [Termination] Act of 1954, the federal
government rejected its avowed policy of the 1950's-forced
assimilation through termination of tribal status-and
reconferred upon one of Wisconsin's historic Indian tribes the
perquisites of recognition as a tribe. Expressly and sym-
bolically, the Restoration Act reaffirmed the principles of In-
dian self-determination and self-government, and, to a
degree, redressed two decades of economic and social distress
suffered by a Native American people whose wants, needs,
and aspirations had largely been ignored or misrepresented
by the United States government. Yet welcome as this rever-
sal of previous policy is, because the Restoration Act applies
only to the Menominee Indians the new policy must be im-
plemented at a time when vestiges of the discredited program
of termination seem to survive.
Restoration of tribal status is an issue which has attracted a
great deal of public attention. Recent events have led to an
hour-long national television program, to strings of daily
front page newspaper stories, and to numerous works by
journalists, scholars, and pamphleteers. However, in the
rush to answer some questions raised by restoration,
Menominee history should not be lost sight of. To begin
with, one cannot answer questions about the Menominee
without reference to the previous pattern of inconsistent In-
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dian policies and governmental practices that initially led to
the termination of the Menominee's tribal status, and, later,
to its restoration. A look at Menominee history gives mean-
ing to the goals of restoration, and may help to predict its
chances for success. In short, the Restoration Act cannot be
understood or interpreted outside the context of Menominee
History.'
The significance of the historical approach goes beyond its im-
portance to those charged with effectuating the Restoration Act.
The study of national Indian policy in the context of one tribe's
history adds a dimension that is often missing in the analysis of In-
dian legislation: it shows the impact that the programs have had
on the people that they have affected. There are still some who
believe in the assimilationist goals of the 1950's; is there a better
way to pierce their rhetoric than by telling them the terrible tale of
Menominee termination? And, there are those who acknowledge
the mistake of the discredited withdrawal policy; is there a better
way to explain the promise of restoration than in the context of
the story of a people who have successfully struggled to survive
the government's mistakes?
Finally, the historical approach presents a means to look
beyond the substance of Indian policy to study the procedures by
which it is formulated. Menominee history shows a clear contrast
between two such processes-that of the 1950's, which was
characterized by paternalism, and that of the 1970's, which
reflects the government's attempt to encourage the Indian to play
a meaningful role in determining the path of his future. The real
promise of the new Indian policy of the 1970's may well be found
in the procedures that have been developed to formulate it.
The first article discusses a period of Menominee history that
ends, in 1954, with the termination of the tribe. This article begins
with the story of the second withdrawal program, Public Law 280,
and ends with a case study of the implementation of the
Menominee Restoration Act.
I. The "Other" Withdrawal Program-Public Law 280
Legislative History
Due to the complex relationship between the tribes and the
federal and state governments, congressional action was required
1. Herzberg, The Menominee Indians: From Treaty to Termination, 60 WISCONSIN
MAGAZINE OF HISTORY 267 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Herzberg).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss1/4
to achieve one of the major goals of the withdrawal pro-
ponents- the transfer of jurisdiction over the Indian country frohn
the federal to the state courts.' This action was necessary because,
in early decisions, the Supreme Court had held that the tribes were
beyond the jurisdiction of the states within whose borders their
reservations existed. By characterizing the tribes as "domestic
dependent nations,". "distinct political communities,"' and "na-
tion(s) of people" beyond the power of the states,s and by inter-
preting the Constitution and the treaties between the tribes and the
United States, the Court found that the federal government held
the exclusive power to regulate the tribes; however, the Court also
found that the United States could delegate this power to the
states. Such legislation, transferring the powers over criminal and
civil jurisdiction from the federal to state governments, became a
major part of the withdrawal program.
During the century prior to the termination era, many states
had petitioned Congress for legislation delegating to them the
right to exercise jurisdiction over the reservations within their
borders. In the face of strong tribal opposition most of these re-
quests were denied.6 By the 1940's, but several states had been
given limited grants of jurisdiction.7 However, in the midst of a
forthcoming major shift in Indian policy, Congress was to aban-
don this piecemeal approach to delegation, lose its sensitivity to
tribal wants, and enact Public Law 280.
This change in national Indian policy was a product of consis-
tent, intense opposition to the New Deal programs that fostered
the preservation of cultural differences and encouraged tribal in-
dependence and self-government. This antagonism was nurtured
by a post-World War II conservatism that feared the "com-
munistic tendencies" of reservation life and abhorred the burgeon-
ing bureaucracy of the Indian department. In Congress, a steady
2. For a comprehensive discussion of the jurisdictional relationship between the tribes
and the state and federal governments, seeF. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1958), at ch. IV.
3. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 178, 181 (1831).
4. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,557 (1832).
5. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 737, 760 (1866).
6. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 62 YALE L.J. 364 (1953).
7. Limited grants were given California, New York, Iowa, North Dakota, and Kansas.
Comment, The Extension of County Jurisdiction Over Indian Reservations in California:
Public Law 280 and the Ninth Circuit, 25 HASTINGS L. REV. 1451, 1468 (1974); H.R. REP.
No. 2503, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1952), Report with Respect to the House Resolution
Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to Conduct an Investigation of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 15031.
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stream of bills was introduced to repeal the keystone of the New
Deal approach, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.'
In 1944, congressional committees began investigating the In-
dian Bureau, seeking a means for its liquidation.' The House Com-
mittee on Indian Affairs surveyed the tribes to determine their at-
titudes toward a transfer of jurisdiction to the states.'" The
removal of Bureau responsibility for this important phase of reser-
vation life was clearly within the scope of the withdrawal program
Congress was developing.
At a hearing of the Senate Committee on Civil Service," in
1947, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Zimmer-
man was asked to present a plan transferring many of the
Bureau's duties to the states within whose borders the reservations
existed. His testimony, calling for the elimination of some tribal
services provided by the federal government, and a long-range
schedule for the removal of formal tribal recognition and status,
became the basis of that part of the withdrawal program that in-
cluded the passage of termination legislation and the enactment of
Public Law 280. "
Although Zimmerman did not mention the transfer of criminal
jurisdiction to the states during his testimony, it was clear that he
intended to end the federal government's contributions to the
maintenance of reservation law and order. On April 15, 1947, in a
paper discussing Zimmerman's new policies, which was presented
in Sari Francisco, Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs John
Provinse stated, "congressional action is necessary to give the
States adequate jurisdiction on Indian reservations."'" He also
said, "In this area of law enforcement the State should undoubted-
ly be given and should assume greater responsibility."'" The
Bureau was an early supporter of the transfer of its responsibility
for maintaining reservation law and order to the states.
8. Wheeler-Howard Act (Indian Reorganization Act), Act of June 18, 1834, 48 Stat. 984,
ch. 576, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 etseq. (1970).
9. House Select Committee to Investigate Indian Affairs and Conditions, An Investiga-
tion to Determine Whether the Changed Status of the Indian Requires a Revision of the
Laws and Regulations Affecting the American Indian, H. REP. 2091, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1944).
10. H.R. REP,. No. 2503, supra note 7, at 144.
11. Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Civil Service, Officers and Employees of the
Federal Government, 80th Cong., lst Sess. (1947).
12. For a thorough treatment of the political climate that brought about the enactment of
the withdrawal programs, see Herzberg, supra note 1, at 301 et seq.; OCRFIELD, A STUDY OF
TERMINArION POLICY (1964) [hereinafter cited as ORFIELDI; Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolu-
tion of the Termination Policy, 5 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977) [hereinafter cited Wilkin-
son & Biggsl.
13. H.R. REP. No. 2503, supra note 1, at 183.
14. Id.
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Congress did not take immediate action to implement Zimmer-
man's call for a comprehensive withdrawal program. His requests
lay dormant until 1949 when a report calling for the rapid
assimilation of the Indian into white society and the transfer of
federal responsibilities to the states once more stimulated congres-
sional interest in formulating a coordinated legislative proposal."
During that period, Congress continued to deal with the states' re-
quests for reservation jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. In 1949, it
passed a bill transferring jurisdiction over the Navajo and Hopi
reservations. 6 In what may have been the last major application of
the New Deal philosophy, President Truman vetoed the bill; he
noted that it had been passed without the tribes' consent and that
Congress' actions had violated "one of the fundamental principles
of Indian law accepted by our Nation, namely, the principle of
respect for tribal self-determination in matters of local govern-
ment." 7 In the years to come, few were to adhere to these fun-
damental principles.
In 1952, Congress assigned a higher priority to the enactment of
withdrawal legislation.'8 On July 1, the House of Representatives
passed a resolution calling for a congressional investigation of the
Indian Bureau.'9 It asked that legislation be drafted to promote
"the earliest practicable termination of all federal supervision and
control over Indians."2
One of the ways the House intended to get the federal govern-
ment out of the Indian business was the transfer of responsibility
for the maintenance of law and order to the states. The resolution
asked the committee to study the Bureau's role in the area of law
and order with an eye toward transferring the job to the states.
The committee was to study the effectiveness of the then current
systems and report on the attitudes of the tribes, states, and coun-
ties toward a federal transfer to state jurisdiction.'
When the congressional committees were not given sufficient
resources to carry out a quick, thorough study, they turned to the
Bureau and asked it to perform the task and to make the necessary
legislative proposals. The Bureau acted quickly. In December, it
15. ORFIELD, supra note 12, at ch. 2, p. 2.
16. S. 1407, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. (1949).
17. 95 CONG. REC. 14785 (1949).
18. For a more complete discussion of the government's actions during this period, see
Herzberg, supra note 1. at 304 et seq.
19. H.R. 698, A Resolution to Authorize the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
to Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
20. Id.
21. H. REP. 2503, supra note 7.
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filed a massive report which called for a complete withdrawal pro-
gram.' In a major proposal it called for legislation to transfer its
law and order functions to the states.n
In the same year, a busy House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs
held hearings 4 to determine whether Congress should continue its
ad hoc treatment of state requests' for jurisdiction or whether it
should enact a comprehensive enabling statute which would allow
states to assume jurisdiction without further federal action. In
both its report to the House and in the testimony of Commissioner
Myer, the Bureau opposed the comprehensive approach. This was
to become a point of conflict between the Bureau and the
legislature in the hearings that were to follow.
With the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 108," Con-
gress took its first step toward the implementation of a withdrawal
program. Rooted in both the language and philosophy of the Zim-
merman testimony and the Bureau report, the resolution express-
ed the sense of Congress that "certain tribes of Indians should be
freed from federal supervision." 7 In it, the House and Senate In-
dian Affairs subcommittees asked Congress to pass legislation
"terminating certain services provided by the Indian Bureau for
Indians by transferring responsibility for such services to other
governmental or private agencies."' In addition, they asked for
action "terminating federal responsibility for administering the af-
fairs of individual Indian tribes as rapidly as circumstances will
permit."29 The Menominee were one of six tribes expressly men-
tioned for immediate termination.
Widely known as the basis of the termination legislation,
H.C.R. 108 actually had a far greater impact; it became the foun-
dation for the enactment of a broad program of withdrawal
legislation that included Public Law 280.3" In the "Background
22. id. at 12.
23. Id at 32.
24. Hearings on H.R. 459, 3235, 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, on State Legaljurisdiction in Indian Country,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. xx (1952).
25. At the time, Congress was considering H.R. 3624, which provided for the extension
of California state criminal jurisdiction to all of the reservations within the state. At the re-
quest of the Bureau, the bill was amended to contain an additional grant of civil jurisdic-
tion. After failing to clear the Senate, the legislation was reintroduced in 1953 (as H.R.
1063), and became the vehicle for the hearings on and enactment of Public Law 280.
26. l-.C.R. 108, Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of Congress that Certain
Tribes cf Indians Should be Freed from Federal Supervision, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
27. Id.
28. The subcommittee reports have the same title as H.C.R. 108. They are H. REP' 841
(1953) and S. REP. 794 (1953).
29. Id.
30. For a listing of the components of the withdrawal program, see Wilkinson & Biggs,
supra note 12, at 149.
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Report" on the Resolution, the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs
stated that legislation in five major areas was to be presented to
Congress. The legislation had "[two] coordinated aims: First,
withdrawal of Federal responsibility for Indian affairs wherever
practicable; and, second, termination of the subjection of Indians
to Federal laws applicable to Indians as such."3' (Both the goals
stated and the "Background Report" were identical to those sub-
mitted with the legislation that was enacted as Public Law 280.)
To accomplish the goals of H.C.R. 108, Congress was asked to
transfer both civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians to the
states. Furthermore, the legislation, which was amended to
become Public Law 280 (H.R. 1063), was expressly mentioned in
the Report: "In addition, H.R. 1063, reported to the House as of
this printing, has as its purpose the conferring of civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Indians upon certain States, wherever abolish-
ment of exclusive Federal jurisdiction is deemed practicable at this
time."3 Congress would not wait long to heed this call for transfer
legislation.
During the First Session of the 83d Congress in 1953-the same
session in which H.C.R. 108 was passed-Congress was faced
with a stream of bills to confer jurisdiction over Indian territory in
California, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota, and
Washington."
However, pursuant to the emergence of the strong withdrawal
movement, and bolstered by the passage of H.C.R. 108, the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on In-
dian Affairs opposed the continuation of the piecemeal legislative
approach and, instead, suggested the passage of legislation
whereby the states could assume jurisdiction without further con-
gressional action. After extensive hearings,"* the Committee
amended the California bill to expand its provisions to those it
contained when enacted as Public Law 280.
In order to understand the nexus between Public Law 280 and
the other manifestations of the withdrawal program, one must
study the legislative proceedings surrounding its passage.
31. H. REP 841 (1953).
32. Id.
33. The bills were H. REP. 1063 (California); H. REP, 1551 (Wisconsin); H. REP. 4546
(South Dakota); S. 1219 (Minnesota); S. 956 (Nebraska); S. 1077 (Washington).
34. The record of the hearings was not published.
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However, because there is no published record of this debate, one
must look to the record of comparable hearings held in 1952.
During the 1952 hearings on state legal jurisdiction in Indian
country, three bills were discussed. The first proposed a transfer
of jurisdiction over all of the Indian country in California."
Originally limited to confer criminal jurisdiction, it was later
amended to include a corresponding grant of civil jurisdiction. As
previously noted, this bill was amended to become Public Law
280. Two other bills were introduced by Congressman Wesley A.
D'Ewart of Montana. In the first, he proposed a grant of criminal
jurisdiction to Montana." The second was broader in scope; in it,
he suggested that the federal government and the states share con-
current criminal jurisdiction over the nation's Indian country."
None of the three bills required the consent of the tribes that were
to be affected. At the opening session of the hearings, in the face of
certain tribal opposition, Congressman D'Ewart moved to amend
his bills to (1) expressly preserve tribal hunting and fishing rights;
(2) require tribal consent to a proposed transfer of jurisdiction to a
state; and (3) grant jurisdiction only when requested to do so by
an individual state." The latter two amendments were to become
the focal points of the debate.
Both the legislative goals presented and the general rhetoric used
by the proponents of the legislation closely resemble those used to
support the passage of H.C.R. 108 and the termination legislation
that was soon to be enacted." Once more, the legislators were called
upon to "free the Indian" and to guarantee his "equality." Once
more, this rhetoric was skillfully used to maneuver the withdrawal
programs through a Congress that was neither sufficiently
knowledgeable about, nor interested in, Indian legislation to look
behind the oratory of the proponents to determine the substance
of the proposals. The carefully understated goal of these cries for
freedom and equality was the forced assimilation of the tribes into
the white cultures that surrounded the reservations, a goal that re-
quired the elimination of the cultural differences protected by
35. Hearings on H. Rep. 459, 3235, 3624, Before the Subcomm. on Indian Alfairs of the
House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, on State LegalJurisdiction in Indian Count',,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) [hereinafter cited as 1952 Hearings].
36. H. REP 3624.
37. H. REP 3235.
38. H. REP. 459.
39. 1952 Hearings, supra note 35, at 5.
40. For a more complete description of the rhetoric used to secure the passage of
withdrawal legislation, see Herzberg, supra note 1, at 307.
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tribal control over reservation jurisdiction. Once more, a theme of
the 1947 Zimmerman testimony was resurrected when Congress
was called upon to pass legislation which, it was said, would save
the federal government money by getting it out of the Indian
business. However, as with the termination legislation, no one
really knew whether the transfer of jurisdiction would actually
save money; in fact, one look at the Bureau's history would have
indicated that it did not support legislation that would, in the long
run, diminish either its budget or its authority." The transfer bills
shared a common goal with their brethren withdrawal legisla-
tion-the forced assimilation of reservation Indians into the sur-
rounding white culture. 2
But not all of those who voted for Public Law 280 were strong
assimilationists. Many believed in the freedom and equality
rhetoric; others found significant tribal benefits in the bills. If
assimilation and dollar saving were the understated objectives of
some proponents, the improvement of reservation law and order
was the express goal of many others who supported the legisla-
tion.
However, the need for transfer legislation to improve tribal law
and order was probably overstated. The record contains unsup-
ported references to an increase in reservational crime. 3 The In-
dian country was called a jurisdictional "no man's land""' within
which Indians could commit crimes with immunity from prosecu-
tion. In addition, it was alleged that neither the tribes nor the
federal government were enforcing the law effectively in those
areas in which they had authority.' The concern was not limited
to the enforcement of the criminal law: in addition, proponents
41. Id. at 306.
42. The Report on Public Law 280 sets forth its assimilationist philosophy: "Similarly
the Indians of several States have reached a stage of acculturation and development that
makes desirable extension of State civil jurisdiction to the Indian country within their
borders. Permitting the State courts to ajudicate civil controversies arising on Indian reser-
vations, and to extend to those reservations the substantive civil laws of the respective
States insofar as those laws are of general application to private persons or private proper-
ty, is deemed desirable." S. REP. No. 699 (July 29, 1953).
43. At least one author did not believe that the reservation crime problem was so severe
as to require the shift to state jurisdiction. See Abourezk, South Dakota Indian
Jurisdiction, 11 S.D.L. REV. 101 (1966). The Bureau itself had taken positions inconsistent
with its characterization of the reservations as lawless, dangerous places. In a report on the
Bureau's programs in Wisconsin, it is stated:"The fact that there is relatively little serious
lawlessness in most Indian communities where there are limited or no facilities for protec-
ting persons or property is a tribute to the stability of the members of these communities."
U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs Program in Wisconsin, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Bureau of In-
dian Affairs, Minn. Area Office, May, 1952, p. 27.
44. 1952 Hearings, supra note 35, at 5.
45. Id. at 14.
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complaied that the reservations were not subject to public health,"
election, 7 marital," and probate regulations. The solution was
simple; by passing the proposed legislation, Congress would fill
the "void" by delegating the power to regulate these matters to the
states.
The jurisdictional void existed, if at all, only in the minds of
confused legislators, bureaucrats, and scholars"' who did not seem
to understand the complex relationship between the federal, state,
and tribal law enforcement agencies. Felix Cohen, a noted Indian
law scholar who appeared before the subcommittee representing
several tribes and Indian organizations, attempted to explain that
far from being a "no man's land" the Indian country was actually
subjected to a myriad of federal and state laws and regulations. He
said:
What I want to say fundamentally is not that there is a no
man's land on the Indian reservation; that is very far from
the case. Not only are Indians subject generally, except in
their dealings among themselves, to state laws at the present
time, under section 13 of title 18, not only are they subject to
all the Federal laws that you and I are subject to, they are also
subject to about 800 special Federal laws that apply to In-
dians just because they are Indians, and in addition to these
800 special laws that apply to Indians just because they are
Indians, there are at the present time about 2,200 Federal
regulations that apply to Indians just because they are In-
dians, in addition to all the Federal regulations that apply to
all of us as citizens.s°
Cohen was correct; the law, if difficult to find, was clear. An In-
dian could not commit a crime (as defined by tribal, state or
federal codes) in Indian country and be immune from either
federal or tribal prosecution.' In addition, federal legislation had
already granted the states the authority to apply their public
46. Id. at 9.
47. ld. at 6.
48. Id.
49. For an example of one scholar's misunderstanding of state criminal jurisdiction, see
Comment, 30 N.D. L. REV. 54, at 56 (1954).
50. 1952 Hearings, supra note 35, at 43.
51. The allocation of jurisdiction between the tribal, federal, and state governments is
controlled by the following statutes: the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153; the General
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152; and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13. For an ex-
cellent discussion of criminal jurisdiction, see Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian
Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REV 503 (1976).
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health laws to the reservations." If there was a gap in reservation
law enforcement, it was the product of a failure of the federal
government to fulfill its responsibility to prosecute; some evidence
was presented to indicate that this failure was based upon the pro-
secutors' reluctance to crowd federal court calendars with Indian
cases." This reluctance can hardly be equated with a jurisdictional
void.
Actually, there was little discussion of the need for the legisla-
tion; what conflict there was during the hearings was centered on
two of the mechanical aspects of transfer. The first question raised
was whether Congress should continue its piecemeal approach to
jurisdictional grants. Opponents of this policy wanted Congress to
pass a comprehensive transfer bill which would allow any state to
assume jurisdiction without further congressional action. The sec-
ond issue focused on a vestige of the New Deal policy that preserv-
ed tribal autonomy by requiring tribal consent to major changes in
policy. Opponents did not want to give the tribes veto powers
over proposed state grants.
The Department of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs joined together in opposing the proposed comprehensive
approach. As noted previously, it was Congressman D'Ewart who
precipitated this conflict by advocating a general grant of jurisdic-
tion. No specific reasons for this proposal appear in the record.
Congressman D'Ewart supported his position with two rhetorical
questions: "Why continue to enact piecemeal legislation? Why not
enact a comprehensive bill such as H.R. 459 which would confer
jurisdiction on all the states that have indicated a desire for such
legislation '"5 Perhaps, because his subcommittee was facing an
ever-increasing number of state requests for legislation, he favored
an approach that would conserve congressional resources.
The Department of the Interior opposed a comprehensive bill.
Assistant Secretary Dale E. Doty wrote the committee supporting
an ad hoc approach. In his letter, he called upon Congress to
respect tribal sovereignty. He noted that many tribes had effective
law and order systems and questioned the wisdom of granting
jurisdiction to states that did not necessarily want it." However,
the Department's position was taken, and Doty's letter sent,
before Congressman D'Ewart had tendered his three amendments
52. See 25 U.S.C. § 231, ch. 216, 45 Stat. 1185 (Feb. 15, 1929); ch. 930, 60 Stat. 962
(Aug. 9, 1946); 1952 Hearings, supra note 35, at 39.
53. 1952 Hearings, supra note 35, at 42.
54. Id. at 11.
55. Id., et. seq.
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to the original bills. Referring to them, D'Ewart stated that no
tribe would be subjected to state law and order without its consent
and that no state would be granted jurisdiction without first hav-
ing taken steps to request it.?
Commissioner Myer also opposed the general legislation. He
preferred an ad hoc system under which the Bureau, after survey-
ing the tribes and states, made recommendations to Congress for
specific legislative grants. However, rather than fight with Con-
gressman D'Ewart, the Commissioner offered the following com-
promise:
On all of these States, where we have had a chance to
make the survey, I think it is possible to consolidate in one
bill, and then leaving out for the time being, if we are agreed,
those reservations that have asked exception rather than to
have six or eight bills, and still stick to the pattern of having a
reasonably simple code that will do the job. 7
As will be seen later, a form of Myer's compromise was enacted.
On the issue of tribal consent, the Commissioner would not
compromise; he found himself opposed not only by tribal
representatives but also by the Department of the Interior and
Congressman D'Ewart. Myer's position was simple; the tribes
should be consulted, but they should not be given the power to
block a proposed transfer." His philosophy was consistent with
his overall approach to tribal governance. He eliminated the New
Deal's requirement that tribes consent to proposed actions that
would affect tribal status; instead, he instituted a system of con-
sultation under which the tribes were to be convinced of the
benefits of a proposed change; however, the changes were to be
made even if the Bureau could not convince the tribes as to their
value." Although tribal representatives, the Department, and
D'Ewart strongly favored a tribal consent provision, the Commis-
sioner's position prevailed.
As might be expected, most of the tribal testimony was focused
on the consent provision. Some of the California bands agreed
with the Commissioner; they favored a bill which unilaterally sub-
jected the tribes to state jurisdiction; they opposed the amendment
which allowed for tribal referenda. ' As shown in their testimony,
they were highly assimilated into the surrounding white culture.
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id. at 26.
58. Id.
59. Herzberg, supra note 1, at 304.
60. 1952 Hearings, supra note 35, at 104, 105.
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There are approximately some 20,000 native California In-
dians. Of this number only about 5,000 or less actually reside
on their reservations or restricted lands. The remaining some
15,000 or more do not now nor have they ever resided on
reservation or restricted lands, but these Indians live among
the general population through the State, most of them own-
ing their own homes. All of these Indian citizens live as in-
dividual responsible people, making their living, and so on,
and asking nor receiving no special favors. They have long
ago earned the right to live on equal terms with their fellow-
men.
And further, many of the men and women included in the
5,000 listed are residing on reservations, make their living off
the reservations where they are compelled to go in seeking
work. From the record made over the years by the Indian
race in California, it must be admitted that these people are
just as capable as any other race, not excepting the "best" of
the white race.'
Already subjected to state jurisdiction because they did not live in
Indian country, they had little to lose from the enactment of
transfer legislation. Perhaps an insight into their advocacy on
behalf of these bills can be found in their support of the entire
withdrawal program. Disgusted with the role the Bureau was
playing in their lives, " they asked to be terminated."' The members
of these bands were not representative of the vast majority of In-
dians who were to be subjected to Public Law 280.
What would have been strong tribal opposition to the proposed
bills was dissipated by D'Ewart's early actions to amend them to
include a consent provision. Representing Indian organizations
and tribes, Felix Cohen said:
I came here yesterday with a difficult and distasteful in-
struction from all my clients, which was to oppose Con-
gressman D'Ewart's H.R. 459. That was an extremely
distasteful assignment for me to have, because Congressman
D'Ewart has done a great deal toward freeing the Indians
from oversupervision and from regulations which make their
lives very difficult.
61. Id. at 64-65.
62. Id. at 66.
63. Id. at 65.
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Fortunately, Congressman D'Ewart has freed me from that
responsibility of speaking in opposition to H.R. 459,
because, it seems to me, the amendments which he has placed
before this committee now remove at least 99 percent of the
Indian objections which I was asked to present, as well as 100
percent of the non-Indian objections."
In addition to statements of support for the consent provision,"
other testimony expressed tribal concern over loss of autonomy
and the power to self-govern, discrimination against Indians in
state courts,7 and a lack of faith in the states' ability to enforce the
law fairly in the Indian countryY However, the proffered amend-
ments seemed to allay these fears, and the tribal opposition was
not intransigent. At the end of the 1952 hearings, there was little
reason for tribal concern over the nature of transfer legislation. It
seemed widely accepted that if any bill were to be passed, it would
include a consent provision. No legislation was enacted during
that session.
In 1953, after another set of hearings' (which were not
reported), a transfer bill was passed. 7 The product of some ob-
vious compromises and curious omissions, it did not reflect the
assurances the tribes thought they had been given during the
previous year.
Congress seems to have accepted the compromise, offered by
Commissioner Myer, between an ad hoc and comprehensive ap-
proach. Five named states (including Wisconsin) were given both
civil and criminal jurisdiction over all or part of the Indian coun-
try within their borders. Exceptions were made for three tribes
that had requested exclusion (including the Menominee).7 , In addi-
tion, Congress gave a general grant of jurisdiction to any state
which would, in the future, act to assume it.'
One omission was prominent-the bill did not contain a tribal
consent provision. The tribes in the named states could not block
the transfer. In a like manner, the unnamed states could unilateral-
ly assume jurisdiction over the Indian country within their
64. Id. at 36.
65. d. at 87, 89-90.
66. Id. at 3-4,
67. Id. at 3-4, 84.
68. Id. at 82.
69. The hearings were held in June, 1953. In July, the House and Senate submitted iden-
tical reports [S. REP. No. 699, July 29, 1953 and H. REP. No. 848, July 16, 19531.
70. Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 505 (Aug. 15, 1953).
71. Id.§§ 2, 4.
72. Id. §§6, 7.
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borders; the tribes had no right to veto the transfer; the bill did not
even require that they be consulted; and the federal government
need not approve of the states' actions. In this respect, the bill was
similar to the one President Truman had criticized and vetoed.'
President Eisenhower was not pleased with the Act, but he signed
it. He expressed "grave doubts as to the wisdom of certain provi-
sions," particularly those sections which permitted "other states to
impose on Indian tribes within their borders the criminal and civil
jurisdiction of the State, removing the Indians from Federal
jurisdiction and, in some instances, effective self-government." He
criticized the failure to include "a requirement of full consultation
in order to ascertain the wishes and desires of the Indians and of
final Federal approval." He called for an immediate amendment to
require consultation with the tribes and the approval of the federal
government before a state could assume jurisdiction." This call
was not to be heeded for fifteen years.
Unfortunately, there is no written record from which to discern
the reasons for the omission of the consent provision from the
1953 legislation. However, even if there were such a record, it is
more likely that the omission was the product of political factors7_
than the result of reasoned debate. Although there had been con-
certed conservative opposition to the consent requirements of the
New Deal Indian programs, it was not until the Republican elec-
tion victories, in 1953, that the opponents of tribal autonomy
were able to gain the positions of power necessary to eliminate
them.
It is not difficult to understand why the participants in the 1952
hearings (which were held before the national elections) assumed
that the bills would include consent provisions. President Truman
had clearly and strongly stated that they were a precondition to
presidential approval of any transfer legislation.'
However, after the major personnel changes brought about by
the 1953 elections, respect for tribal sovereignty ceased to be the
touchstone by which the validity of proposed legislation was
tested. In control of both the presidency and the legislature, the
Republicans were able to control both the membership and chair-
manships of the Indian Affairs committees. Two conservatives,
73. See text accompanying note 17.
74. S. ABERLE & W. BROPHY, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 186 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as ABERLE & BROPHY].
75. For a more complete discussion of the political changes that enabled the passage of
the withdrawal legislation, see Herzberg, supra note 1, at 305 etseq.
76. See text accompanying note 17.
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Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah," and Representative E.V. Berry
of South Dakota, were appointed to chair the respective subcom-
mittees that were to shape the withdrawal legislation. These two
committee chairmen were inordinately powerful. There was
usually very little interest in Indian legislation; few committee
members made an effort to understand the intricacies of the pro-
posed legislation; deference was given the positions taken by the
chairmen and the legislation's sponsors; and so little controversy
surrounded these bills that cross-party consensus was usually
achieved. Senator Watkins and Congressman Berry used this
power to bring about the passage of a broad withdrawal program.
In a like manner, in the executive branch, Commissioner Myer
was able to consolidate his power. A proponent of the withdrawal
legislation, he strongly opposed tribal consent provisions.
This combination of political factors created the atmosphere in
which the often harsh and retrogressive withdrawal legislation
was enacted; none of these changes in policy was made subject to
tribal approval. The last, and perhaps most important vestige of
the New Deal policy-the respect for tribal sovereignty and self-
determination-had been eliminated, a victim of political change.
The Menominee and Public Law 280
The Menominee, who were to be subjected to both of the major
manifestations of the withdrawal program-termination and
Public Law 280-entered the 1950's a relatively prosperous, self-
sufficient tribe." One of a very few tribes to hold assets com-
munally, the Menominee owned a heavily wooded 233,092-acre
reservation, a lumber mill, power plants, schools, and medical
facilities. Members of the tribe received a broad spectrum of
health, education, and welfare services. Unlike most other tribes,
the Menominee paid, either directly or indirectly, for these
benefits. Most Menominee were able to find jobs on the reserva-
tion; the tribe's mill was run so as to maximize employment rather
than profits. The recent recipients of an $8.5 million legal settle-
ment,7" the Menominee looked forward to a period of growth and
prosperity.
77. More than any other person, Senator Watkins shaped and brought about the passage
of the withdrawal legislation. His behavior during this time was not exemplary. To
evaluate the role he played in terminating the Menominee, see Herzberg, supra note 1. at
311 et seq.
78. For a complete discussion of the tribe's pretermination status, see id. at 295 el seq.
79. The settlement was the result of years of litigation against the United States, id. at
290 et seq.
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As the tribe entered the 1950's, its major weakness was its in-
ability to adapt the white institutions of government to its deeply
divided, factioned membership.' As required by federal law, the
Menominee adopted a written constitution which created
legislative bodies that were to advise the Indian Bureau on issues
of tribal government. The Advisory Council was elected every
two years. Responsible for the daily operations of the tribe, it was
dominated by an elite, highly acculturated faction.8 ' The ultimate
tribal authority was vested in the General Council which,
theoretically, was composed of all adult Menominee, but which
was, in reality, ignored by the traditional factions and the majori-
ty of the tribe. This lack of interest in, and respect for, the General
Council, when combined with periodic, hostile fighting between
those factions that did attend the meetings, led to the failure of the
attempt to impose a town meeting form of government on the
tribe. Therefore, the Menominee lacked a government that could
act quickly, decisively, and with the confidence of the tribe.
Perhaps, given time and support, this major weakness could have
been eliminated; but, the Menominee government was to be given
neither the time nor the opportunity to improve.
For the Menominee, the 1950's were not to be years of growth
and prosperity; instead, an early target of the withdrawal pro-
gram, the tribe was to be terminated. The story of the termination
of the Menominee is a long tale told elsewhere. 3 However, the
events of the termination period are so tightly tied to those sur-
rounding the application of Public Law 280 to the tribe that a
short summary, to place both in context, is necessary. Identified in
Acting Commissioner Zimmerman's 1947 testimony as an "ex-
cellent possibility for termination," the Menominee inadvertently
placed themselves before a withdrawal oriented Congress when
they asked for special legislation to allow a per capita distribution
of a portion of their $8.5 million settlement; in both 1951 and
1952, the proposed legislation failed to clear Congress. In 1953, a
80. For a more thorough description of social and cultural divisions within the tribe, see
id. at 298.
81. Many of the Advisory Council members held the better reservation jobs that were
doled out by the local Bureau agents. They were, therefore, somewhat susceptible to
Bureau pressure. That the Bureau knew of and used this leverage is seen in the following
portion of a report filed by R.W. Quinn, Program Officer of the Menominee Agency. He
described the Advisory Council as "an organizational device which the Indian Bureau uses
to activate its policies and programs." Memorandum to Melvin L. Robertson from R.W.
Quinn, Nov. 21, 1955. Wisconsin State Historical Soc'y, BIA File, Box 1.
82. For a discussion of the tribal government, seeHerzberg, supra note 1, at 298.
83. Id. ORFIELD, supra note 12.
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similar bill was brought before Senator Arthur V. Watkins' sub-
committee on Indian affairs. The senator used his control over the
subcommittee to turn the appropriation proposal into a termina-
tion bill. Surprised, the Menominee invited Senator Watkins to
visit the reservation to explain his actions. At a General Council
meeting, held on June 20, 1953, Senator Watkins took a hard line.
The Menominee were to be terminated-it was inevitable. If they
were wise, and if they wanted their per capita distribution, they
would cooperate with the senator and the withdrawal forces. In
the heat of the moment, without a full understanding of the con-
cept of termination, and acting under the influence of the senator's
threats, a small number of Menominee passed a resolution ac-
cepting, in principle, the amorphous idea of termination. Within a
month, the tribe recognized that in its haste it had made a mistake.
It voted to rescind its support for the withdrawal program, know-
ing fully that this antitermination position would eliminate its
chance of receiving the per capita payments. Congress chose to ig-
nore this latter resolution; instead, Senator Watkins repeatedly
told the legislators that the Menominee had consented to their ter-
minaltion. The tribe, knowing this, assumed that the withdrawal
program would inevitably be applied to them; instead of continu-
ing what would have been futile opposition, the Menominee asked
Congress for nothing but some additional time and financial
assistance so that they could prepare to function without federal
support. They received little of either. In addition, the major plan-
ning responsibilities were placed on the tribe; it was to get little
help from the federal government. When President Eisenhower
signed the Menominee Termination Act, on June 1, 1954, a heavy
burden was placed on a tribal government that was already
severely strained and in many ways incapable of responding
quicklv and decisively.
The Menominee were more successful in their early resistance to
that part of the withdrawal program that proposed jurisdictional
transfer legislation. In 1951, when it became clear that the state of
Wisconsin and the counties surrounding the reservation favored
the transfer of federal and tribal jurisdiction to the state,' the
Menominee passed a resolution which took a position against the
transfer." The Bureau, in its 1952 report that became the basis of
the withdrawal legislation, stated that the tribe's opposition was
84. H. REP. 2503, supra note 7, at 108.
85. REsolution of the General Council, Feb. 3, 1951.
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based on two factors: first, the Menominee had a highly acclaimed
law and order system;" second, the tribe wanted to maintain the
autonomy and power of self-government fostered by tribal
jurisdiction."7 Both of these factors were later cited by Congress as
the basis for the Menominee exemption from the coverage of
Public Law 280," the only exemption granted a Wisconsin tribe.
However, one cannot explain the exemption as a product of con-
gressional deference to the tribe's autonomy in the area of law en-
forcement; at the same time, the same congressmen were striking
the ultimate blow against tribal independence by passing the
Menominee Termination Act. It is more likely that the
Menominee were freed from Public Law 280 not because of their
desires, and not because they were proficient in law enforcement,
but because the congressmen knew that as a terminated people,
the individual Menominee were soon to be subjected to state
jurisdiction anyway. For whatever reason, the Menominee had
won a significant, if short lived, victory.
The Menominee were not to reap the benefits of this triumph.
Within months, under the pressure of imminent termination, the
General Council passed a resolution asking Congress to amend
Public Law 280 so as to put the Menominee Reservation within the
coverage of its provisions. Congress acted immediately. On
August 24, 1954, just two months after the passage of the
Menominee Termination Act, the tribe was placed within the
jurisdiction of Wisconsin's law and order system.
The resolution was not a reversal of the Menominee's near
unanimous opposition"" to state jurisdiction; instead, the vote
represents the tribe's attempt to cope with the realities and respon-
sibilities of termination. When terminated, the Menominee were
to be subjected to state law and order. In the period between the
passage of the Termination Act and its implementation, the tribe
was required to submit a plan for the transfer of Bureau programs
to the state;"' among the roles to be transferred was the respon-
sibility for tribal law enforcement. Feeling the heavy planning
burden, and knowing that the tribe's financial resources were to
become dear, the Menominee questioned the wisdom of spending
86. H. REP. 2503, supra note 7, at 108. For a description of the Menominee Law and
Order Program, see Herzberg, supra note 1, at 299 etseq.
87. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs Program in Wisconsin (1952), at 7.
88. S. REP. 699, H. REP. 848, supra note 69, at 2412.
89. Letter from Department of Interior to Members of the Menominee Tribe, p. 5, Nov.
12, 1954.
90. 25 U.S.C. § 896 (1970).
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their limited funds to continue a tribal law and order system that
they would soon be forced to abandon. But for the spectre of ter-
mination on the horizon, the Menominee would have maintained
their opposition to Public Law 280 and retained their exemption
from it.
The passage of the resolution is but another example of the dif-
ficulty with which the General Council functioned under pressure;
in fact, the meeting on Public Law 280 is strikingly similar to one
at which the Menominee "consented" to termination." At neither
meeting was evidence presented to show the social or financial im-
pact of the proposals presented. At both meetings the debate was
rushed; consensus-the traditional tribal mechanism for decision-
making-was not attained; requests for delays, to allow for a
cooling-off period and later debate, were ignored. Both votes were
influenced by the presence and performance of white men who
dominated the meetings. The termination vote was a product of
Senator Watkins' visit; the Public Law 280 vote reflected the in-
fluence of the tribe's attorney and a Bureau representative. In both
cases, only a small minority of Menominee attended the meeting
and voted. Perhaps the greatest similarity is the tribe's attempt to
recant both resolutions; within six weeks of the Public Law 280
vote, the General Council unanimously passed a resolution asking
Congress to repeal the amendment so that the reservation would
no longer come within Wisconsin's jurisdiction. Just as their at-
tempt to repeal their "consent" to termination was ignored, so too
was their request to repeal the amendment to Public Law 280.
The issue of Menominee acceptance of state law and order was
presented at the April 24, 1954, General Council meeting by Mr.
Davis, a white Bureau representative. He was supported by the
tribe's white attorney, Mr. Andrews. Each played an important
role in obtaining the tribe's "consent" to Public Law 280.
Whereas the proponents of termination often used rhetoric call-
ing for Congress to "free the Indian," Davis chose the rhetoric of
another American right, "equality," to convince the tribe to accept
the resolution. He told the Council that the question was whether
"the Menominees would like to accept the State court jurisdiction
and be treated the same as other Indian people in this state.""2
91. For an analysis of the termination vote, seeHerzberg, supra note 1, at 315-16.
92. Minutes of the Menominee General Council Meeting, Apr. 24, 1954, at 28
[hereinafter cited as Minutes].
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Attorney Andrews approached the issue from another perspec-
tive. Noting that the tribe would be subjected to state law and
order upon its termination, he questioned the wisdom of waiting
until that time. He said:
Now I think we all know and all recognize that within a
matter of a few years, three, four, or five-whatever comes
out of Washington either on the Watkins Bill or the tribal
bill-[referring to the termination legislation] this tribe and
this reservation will definitely be under the jurisdiction of the
State of Wisconsin. Therefore, in bringing this to you now,
the one sole issue presented to you for consideration this
afternoon is this: Should the Menominee Tribe ask for an im-
mediate amendment to this Bill I have just discussed, which
will bring the tribe in under State Law and Order as soon as
such an amendment might be passed by the Congress; or, in
the alternative, shall the tribe wait until the Watkins Bill, or
some form of the Watkins Bill, puts you under State Law and
Order in the next three, four, or five years. That is the issue
presented here for discussion and debate this afternoon.'
Later, during the debate, Andrews took a clear position favoring
the resolution when he said:
We know and realize that we are going to become a part of
the State of Wisconsin-we can't help ourselves on that-and
so long as that will happen to us eventually in the next four
or five years at the most, we might as well adopt this princi-
ple now and have some experience under it and be better
prepared for it. 4
To the tribe it was clear. Termination was inevitable. State
jurisdiction was inevitable. The only question remaining was
when both were to occur.
Some Menominee thought there was a good reason to act im-
mediately to accept state law and order; they wanted to save the
tribal dollars that were supporting their own law enforcement pro-
gram. They knew this money would be needed when the federal
government withdrew its support from the reservation. Picking up
on this, Davis led them to believe that the move to state law and
order would result in significant savings-a position that was later
to prove to be untrue. A member of the tribe noted that the
93. Id. at 30.
94. Id. at 31.
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Menominee had been spending $40,000 a year on law and order.
He asked Davis, "If we go under State Law and Order, what will
that cost us?"95 Davis, who had previously stated that the
Menominee were paying "much more than [was] normally paid"
for their system, answered:
The cost of a misdemeanor is paid by the offending person,
or paid by public moneys. In other areas where State Court
Jurisdication has gone into effect-take Odanah they have a
township organized and have a constable. Other than that,
the sheriff takes over. In others, they have two men besides
the sheriff. Tribal money is not used. The Cherokees in
North Carolina, it costs about $15,000. They maintain four
police officers that are hired by the tribe under a program
they have developed."
The implication was clear. Public Law 280 would save the tribe
money.
The improvement of reservation law and order was a third,
albeit minor, theme used to support the resolution. When asked
whether the tribe's law and order was costing too much, Davis
responded that he thought it was, and that it was his opinion that
"the inadequacy of this court [the tribal court] to properly deal
with offenders [was] responsible for the continuance of crime on
the reservation." 7 At another point he argued that Public Law 280
would improve tribal law and order by providing state institutions
for the incarceration of juveniles, and state extradition law to br-
ing back parents who had moved from the reservation while leav-
ing their children behind."
Apparently, Davis, who was from the Minneapolis Bureau of-
fice, was not familiar with either the successful Menominee law
and order system, or the cultural differences between white and
Indian treatment of juveniles and families. As previously noted,
both the Menominee police force and the tribe's courts had won
the praise of all who had evaluated them. Davis seemed to be
unaware of the Bureau's previously taken position that there was
not a serious crime problem on the reservation. In suggesting that
the tribe use state institutions for the incarceration of juveniles, he
failed to respect an important cultural difference. If possible, In-
dians preferred to keep juvenile offenders in the reservation com-
95. id. at 32.
96. id. at 33 (emphasis added).
97. fd. at 32.
98. fd. at 28.
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munity; putting young people in jail was disfavored.' Even if the
tribe had wanted to incarcerate its juvenile offenders, it could
have used state institutions without subjecting itself to state
jurisdiction. Davis failed to tell the Menominee that they could
contract with the state for the use of its facilities. Davis was insen-
sitive to Indian family practices; he applied a white set of values to
family law when he said, "I believe that people who desert their
families should be brought back and made to assume their obliga-
tions."'" Traditionally, Indians recognized a broader sense of
family; it was not a tribal offense for a parent, who was leaving
the reservation, to place a child in the custody of a family member
or trusted friend. ' In suggesting that Public Law 280 was needed
to improve reservation juvenile and family law, Davis was insen-
sitive to the tribe's customs and needs.
Finally, both Davis and Andrews told the Menominee that
Public Law 280 might help protect the soon-to-be-terminated
tribe's hunting and fishing rights. However, neither offered a
reasoned analysis as to this possible reason for supporting the
resolution.'2
Some Menominee did not think they knew enough about the
consequences of the resolution; they wanted to postpone the deci-
sion. An early attempt to table the issue was ignored by the chair-
man.'3 After this, another Menominee complained about the haste
with which the tribe was being asked to act. He said:
We don't want to have anything brought in here and shoved
down our throats whether we like it or not. We want to
discuss this a little further. We have no time now. We have
big business before us. I think the best thing to do is to table
the question and put it aside for a while.'"
99. For a discussion of the special relationship between the Indian child, his parents, and
his tribe, see Jarvis, The Theft of Life, 9 AKWESASNE NOTES 31 (1977). The removal of In-
dian children from their families, for either educational or disciplinary purposes, is such a
serious threat to the Indian community and its way of life that it has recently received
special attention. See, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Comm. on
Interior & Insular Affairs, On Problems that Indian Families Face in Raising their Children
and How These Problems are Affected by FederalAction or Inaction, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(Apr. 8, 9, 1974); The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977, S. 1214, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) (passed by the Senate on Nov. 4, 1977).
100. Minutes, supra note 92, at 28.
101. Indians have long recognized the concept of the extended family. See Harvis, The
Theft of Life, 9 AKWESASNE NOTES 31 (1977). The concept is now being recognized by both
courts [Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973)] and
Congress, S. 1214, supra note 99.
102. Minutes, supra note 92, at 31, 33.
103. Id. at 35.
104. Id.
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The debate continued. Eventually the following resolution was
formally placed before the Council:
RESOLVED by the Menominee Indian Tribe assembled in
General Council this 24th day of April, 1954, that the delega-
tion in Washington, D.C., and the tribal attorneys, are
hereby authorized to seek an amendment to Public Law 280,
removing the provision excepting the Menominee Reserva-
tion from the application of this law.'
After it was seconded, the discussion continued.
After several questions were asked to which complete, concrete
answers could not be given, a Menominee asked that a committee
of five be appointed to work with the Bureau to gather the
necessary information.'" He, too, was ignored.
Finally, a vote was precipitated by the challenge of a supporter
of the resolution, who said, "You people seem to be afraid of the
law. Why don't we vote on Mr. Dickie's resolution now?''1
Another argued for an immediate vote, saying, "Eventually we
will go under it anyway. I don't know what you are afraid of.
Why should we wait?"'" From the floor came the call, "Question!
Question!""' Without further discussion, the Menominee voted.
Of the 99 Menominee present, 78 favored the resolution and 11
voted against it. "' The tribe's near unanimous position opposing
Public Law 280 and state jurisdiction had been formally
reversed."'
Congress acted quickly to place the Menominee under state law
and order. The Assistant Secretary of the Interior, in a letter to the
Chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee,
105. Id. at 38.
106. Id. at 42.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. It is tempting, indeed, to speculate as to how a small minority of the Menominee
Tribe were able to bring about a complete reversal of the tribe's deeply held opposition to
state jurisdiction. The minutes are replete with indications of a conflict between tribal fac-
tions. One is tempted to assume that the proponents were a highly organized portion of the
assimilated faction. However, this conclusion cannot be supported by the minutes alone,
and corroborative data is not available. At least one scholar has attempted an explanation.
In his Ph.D. thesis on the "Field Administration of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Min-
nesota and Wisconsin," John J. Hebl, citing as a source an interview with James L.
Frechette0 says: "It should be noted that the leadership of the Menominee Reservation
sought to prevent transfer of jurisdiction to the state, but during the absence of the Chair-
man of the Advisory Council in Washington, a rival group obtained action by the General
Council requesting that jurisdiction be given to the state." Hebl, Field Administration of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs in Minnesota and Wisconsin, 434 (1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss1/4
noted that formal legislative procedures were not being followed
because the matter was of such an"urgency" that it required im-
mediate attention."' Although the record does not indicate why
the legislation was being rushed through, perhaps it was because
the government knew that the Menominee were unhappy with
their resolution and were moving to rescind it. The amendment
became law on August 24, 1954."
Almost immediately, tribal opposition to Public Law 280 began
to surface. On October 9, 1954, the General Council voted to seek
the repeal of the amendment that subjected them to state jurisdic-
tion.
The issue was raised by a Menominee, who said:
I would like to make a resolution at this time to strike out
Public Law 280 for the simple reason that the Menominee
people were not informed of what that law meant. They did
not understand just in what way they would jeopardize
themselves. I think that at the time this Public Law came to
the General Council, there should have been more discus-
sion. We should have talked it over a lot more. That is my
reason for making a resolution to strike out Public Law 280."'
She was not alone in her dissatisfaction with the resolution.
Another member thought he had been misled. He had
understood that Public Law 280 would save the tribe a significant
amount of money. He was upset because "about three weeks later
I saw where our attorney had a meeting with the District Attorney
[of Shawano County] and was making concessions to them so we
would have to pay."" '
In fact, the Menominee did have to make a significant payment
toward the provision of state law and order services; in giving up
their successful tribal system, the tribe saved but $6,792.93."
At the October 9 meeting, the following resolution was
presented to the General Council:
112. S. REP. 2223, Aug. 5, 1954 and H. REP. 2322, July 20, 1954 (to accompany H.R.
9821), at 3172.
113. Act of Aug. 24, 1954, 68 Stat. 795, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970). The
record indicates that the amendment was passed at the request of the Menominee. It was
also noted that its purpose was to "provide for orderly termination of Federal supervision
over the property and members of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin." H.R. 9821,
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 100 CONG. REC. 13115 (1954).
114. Minutes of General Council Meeting, Oct. 9, 1954, at 42.
115. Id.
116. Minutes of General Council Meeting, Oct. 31, 1954, at 19.
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A resolution to strike out the public law 280 because our
Menominee people did not understand what it all meant, and
did not know that they would jeopardize themselves in any
way, and therefore I move on this 9th day of October, 1954
to appeal to the Congress and the President of the United
States to repeal the law to give it further consideration on the
part of the Menominees."'
A Menominee, concerned that Public Law 280 was not in fact
saving the tribe money, moved the following amendment: "That
no Menominee Indian funds be appropriated to Shawano or
Oconto counties, or the State of Wisconsin, for Law & Order."' '
The amendment passed by a vote of 80-0. The amended resolution
was adopted by a vote of 70-0."
However, Congress did not deem action on this resolution
"urgent." Instead, it was ignored. From January 1, 1955, until the
date of their termination, April 30, 1961, the Menominee were
subjected to state law by Public Law 280.
Once more, under the pressures of their imminent termination,
the Menominee cast and uninformed vote that would later be
characterized as an indication of their consent to a withdrawal
program. Once more, upon taking a sober second look, they passed
a resolution seeking to rescind their previous actions. (The subse-
quent vote to rescind was a practice established by years of tradi-
tional tribal government. 2 ') Once more, Congress chose to ignore
a resolution that was not consistent with its plans for the
Menominee. And, more, the Menominee were to pay dearly, both
economically and socially, for their actions.
The application of Wisconsin law to the Menominee and the ex-
tension of the state's criminal and civil jurisdiction to their reser-
vation extinguished important tribal rights and subjected the
Menominee to additional assimilation pressures that encouraged
the elimination of the remaining vestiges of the cultural differences
which were preserved by the tribal courts and codes.
Most obvious was the loss of tribal sovereignty and autonomy
which was manifested in an important area of self-gov-
ernment-the maintenance of reservation law and order. Derived
from original concepts of tribal sovereignty, the United States had
117. Minutes of General Council Meeting, Oct. 9, 1951, at 13.
118. Id. at 64.
119. Id
120. Herzberg, supra note 1, at 316.
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long recognized the tribe's right to regulate its own internal
affairs.'"' This right included the power to operate its own law and
order systems-systems that were to reflect tribal customs,' tradi-
tions, and mores. State jurisdiction was clearly inconsistent with
this tribal right.'"
The application of Public Law 280 denied the Menominee the
benefits of the tribal/federal jurisdiction system which was de-
signed, in great part, to protect Indians from discrimination at the
hands of the states' white citizens.' 4 In those cases where Indians
were to be prosecuted outside of the tribal courts, they were enti-
tled to the benefits that accompanied a trial in a federal court that
was established pursuant to Article III of the United States Con-
stitution. Central to these benefits was a trial before an indepen-
dent federal judge who, protected by grants of life tenure and
assured compensation, was somewhat insulated from the
pressures and prejudices of his white neighbors.'" As has been
noted, many tribes resisted Public Law 280 both because they did
not want to give up these federal protections and because they
were afraid their white neighbors would not treat them fairly. The
Menominee had reason to join this opposition to state jurisdiction.
The state courts surrounding the Menominee reservation were
dominated by their white neighbors; the judges were white; the
prosecutors were white; the lawyers were white; and the jurors
were white.' State jurisdiction eliminated the insulation and pro-
tection from prejudice afforded the Menominee by the
tribal/federal system.
121. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
122. ExparteCrow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
123. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
124. In discussing the protective aspects of federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court said,
"Local interference in such cases generally results in the punishment of the Indian and the
acquittal of the white man .... No white man ever hung for killing an Indian, and no In-
dian tried for killing a white man ever escaped the gallows." United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
125. The importance of these protections was argued by Alexander Hamilton in the 78th
and 79th Federalist Papers."That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Con-
stitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice,
can certainly not be expected from Judges who hold their offices by a temporary commis-
sion." Hamilton argued the need for independence as a general principle; its importance is
magnified when the court is called upon to deal with the prosecution of a member of a
minority group.
126. The Menominee were placed within the jurisdiction of the Shawano County court
system. For many years they could neither vote for the district attorney nor serve on the
county's juries; they later won these rights through litigation. Otradavec v. Dickinson, Cir.
Ct. Menominee County, Wis. (Sept. 5, 1972). The Menominee were not treated fairly in the
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Finally, the transfer of jurisdiction caused by cultural, social,
and psychological losses which, if intangible, are no less mean-
ingful than the more ascertainable losses previously discussed. It is
difficult to assess the impact of the application of a new legal
system, based on different cultural values, to the more traditional,
less assimilated, Menominee. It is equally difficult to assess the
psychological damage done to those Menominee who were tried in
alien state courts. The Menominee had been proud of their ac-
claimed law and order system; it is difficult to measure the loss of
pride they must have felt when their power to control this impor-
tant aspect of reservation life was taken from them and transferred
to the state. Although subtle and not easily assessed, perhaps these
losses were felt as deeply as any of those brought about by the
withdrawal programs.
[I. The Impact of Termination on the Menominee Tribe
No matter how great the tribal losses suffered as a result of
Public Law 280, they pale when compared to the destruction of
the Menominee way of life brought about by the application of the
other major withdrawal program-termination."' Because the
passage of the Menominee Restoration Act was a direct response
to this, terrible tale of tribal losses, it deserves to be told here.' 5
Shawano courts. See RAY, THE MENOMINEE TRIBE OF INDIANS, 1940-1970, Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. R-3, Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 134 -67 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as RAY, MENOMINEE TRIBE]; RAY, FREEDOM WITH RESERVATION-THE
MENOMINEE STRUGGLE TO SAVE THEIR LAND AND PEOPLE 40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as RAY,
FREEDOM!1; Hearings, S. 1687, on the Menominee Restoration Act, Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Indian Affairs, Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 237
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1687.
127. When the termination act became effective, on Apr. 30, 1961, the Menominee
lifestyle underwent a transformation so complex as to be beyond the scope of this article,
but some of the details must be summarily stated. The reservation ceased to exist;
Menominee County was created to take its place. All of the tribe's communally held assets
were transferred to a corporation, Menominee Enterprises Incorporated (MEI). In exchange
for his interest in the communal property, each Menominee was given an income bond and
100 shares of MEI common stock. The actual shares were held by a voting trust. The in-
dividual Menominee were granted certificates of beneficial interest which limited their
power to manage their assets to the performance of one function-the election of the voting
trust. For further information, see The Menominee Termination Plan, 26 Fed. Reg. 3727
(1961); RAY, FREEDOM, supra note 126; Hearings on S. 1687, supra note 126, at 252 et seq.
128. See RAY, FREEDOM, supra note 126, at ch. IX; ABERLE & BROPHY, supra note 74, at
199 et seq.; ORFIELD, supra note 12, ch. 6, p. 11 et seq.; Hearings on S. C.R. 26 Before the
Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Hearings on S.
1687, supra note 126; Hearings on H.R. 7421, the Menominee Restoration Act, Before the
House Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 74211.
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The passage of the Menominee Termination Act brought about
an immediate, rapid decline in both the success of the tribe's enter-
prises and the well-being of the individual Menominee. This
should not have been a surprise. The Menominee prosperity, more
apparent than real, was the product of two factors, both of which
were eliminated by the termination legislation.' First, the enter-
prises were exempt from both state licensing requirements and the
attendant state standards and regulations; after termination, the
hospital, the mill, the utility plants, and the schools required ex-
tensive improvements to qualify for the state certification essential
to their continued operation. Second, an exemption from state,
federal, and local taxes created the artificial business context
within which the mill was run so as to maximize employment op-
portunities rather than profits; when faced with the payment of
these taxes, the mill management had to change its employment
and business practices. The tax exemption had also applied to the
income and property of the individual Menominee; many families
could not subsist on their incomes when they were diminished by
these taxes. Once these exemptions, the cornerstone of the ap-
parent Menominee prosperity, were eliminated by the termination
legislation, the tribe faced immediate economic and social crises.
Of all the termination losses suffered by the Menominee, the
depletion of the tribe's cash reserve is most easily observed. When
the termination act was passed, the government held $10,437,000
in the Menominee treasury accounts. 3 This apparently secure
cash position was an important factor in Congress' decision to
withdraw federal support from the tribe.' A rapid cash drain
began immediately. With little federal support, the Menominee
had to pay for expensive pretermination studies.'32 In addition,
with little help, the tribe had to improve its facilities so they would
qualify for state licensing. For the first time, the Menominee were
forced to use a system of deficit spending.'33 By 1960, they had
spent $12,265,424.' In 1961, on the termination day, the tribal ac-
counts contained $1,750,000; ' by 1964, they held $300,000;' 3° and
129. Herzberg, supra note 1, at 296.
130. 1966 Report of the Menominee Indian Study Commission, 18 [hereinafter cited as
1966 Report].
131. Herzberg, supra note 1, at 309.
132. Id. at 323-26.
133. 1966 Report, supra note 130, at 19.
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id.
136. WILKINSON, KNIGHT, & PRELOZNIK, THE MENOMINEE RESTORATION ACT: LEGAL
ANALYSIS 6 (1973).
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in 1972, the reserves were down to $58,795.' ' The weakened
financial position had its greatest impact on the tribal enterprises.
The depletion of capital eliminated an important source of tribal
income-the interest payments received on the treasury accounts.
The Menominee had previously used these payments to voluntari-
ly reimburse the state and federal governments for services per-
formed on the reservation.'35 With termination, the tribe would
have to both provide and pay for these services. No longer able to
rely on this traditional source of funding, the Menominee had to
place this burden on the struggling tribal enterprises. In a like
manner, the effects of the loss of the cash position were felt in all
areas of tribal life. 3 '
The Menominee health care system was completely destroyed
by the termination program. Perhaps this destruction of a key
tribal institution, and its effect on the individual Menominee, best
exemplifies the impact of the withdrawal legislation. The system
had been run by the Menominee; it was reservation based, com-
prehensive, and inexpensive. On the reservation, the tribe owned
and maintained both a hospital and a clinic. Each member was en-
titled to complete medical, surgical, and dental care. And, in
sharp contrast to the cost of nonreservation health care, each
Menominee family paid only $38 per year for complete
coverage. "' With the removal of federal assistance, and the ap-
plication of Wisconsin's licensing standards, the tribe had to aban-
don its system. The Menominee were forced to turn, unsuccessful-
ly, to the commercial medical market in the surrounding, non-
Indian communities. Although predictable, the loss was not
necessary.
On January 1, 1961, the 45-bed Menominee hospital, the sym-
bolic center of the health care program, was closed, a victim of the
tribe's inability to comply with state licensing standards. This loss,
too, should not have been a surprise. Although characterized by
137. Id.
138. Herzberg, supranote 1, at 296.
139. Examples of termination related capital expenditures are:
(1) in 1954, $4,881,000 in per capita payments to Menominee (payments made pursuant
to the Termination Act) [1966 Report, supra note 130, at 191;
(2) in 1955, $2,268,240 in supplemental per capita payments, ORFIELD, WAR ON
MENOMINEE POVERTY, 591;
(3) from 1955-1960, $2,116,184 in stumpage payments to individual Menominee 11966
Report, supra note 130, at 191;
(4) from 1954-1959, $2,400,000 to pay for tribal and federal agency operations and some
school construction, id. and
(5) at least $600,000 was spent on hospital and school renovations, id.
140. Herzberg, supra note 1, at 296.
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the state in a pretermination report as a "modern institution,
recently reconstructed,"'' the hospital needed extensive im-
provements to qualify for state certification. The Menominee
made a real effort to save the hospital; they spent more than
$300,000 on renovation projects. After the work was completed,
the building was inspected and found to have at least ten major
code violations. In July, 1960, nine months before they were to be
terminated, the General Council asked the Department of the In-
terior for help. Two months later, a Department official reported
that the hospital could be brought into compliance at a cost of
$50,000. When the federal government refused to give the
assistance necessary to finish the repairs, the Menominee were
forced to close the hospital. It was not until four months after the
closing that the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John 0.
Crowe, responded to the tribe's initial request for help. He wrote:
It is our opinion that it would not have been practical or
economically feasible to bring the existing hospital building
within the standards of the State of Wisconsin .... In view of
the absence of a directive or an understanding that the
building would comply [with state standards] this office has
no alternative but to reject the Council's request "that the
deficiencies be remedied."'4 2
The government would not spend the $50,000 necessary to
preserve the keystone of the Menominee health program. The
government would not spend the $50,000 necessary to give mean-
ing to the tribe's investment. At a time when tribal resources were
severely depleted, the Menominee had wasted $300,000."'
However great the financial loss, it did not compare to the health
crisis and drop in tribal morale that followed the closing of the
hospital.
In a like manner, termination brought the close of the other
reservation medical and dental facilities." ' With no resident doc-
tors in Menominee County, the people had to go to the private
doctors in Shawano County for treatment. This created several
problems. The first was financial; once eligible for complete care
141. Report to the Menominee Indian Study Committee, Joint Legislative Council, State
of Wisconsin, on County and Local Government for the Menominee Indian Reservation,
Bureau of Government, University of Wisconsin Extension Division, Madison, 3 (1956).
142. RAY, MENOMINEE TRIBE, supra note 126, at 84.
143. With the closing of the hospital, the tribe sold its medical equipment at a substantial
loss. 1966 Report, supra note 130, at 24.
144. RAY, MENOMINEE TRIBE, supra note 126, at 55.
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at a minimal cost, for the first time the Menominee were forced to
pay for medical services. Although some who worked for the mill
or the county had health insurance, and others received medical
care cards from the welfare department, many Menominee fell in
between and could not afford health care. Reliance on facilities in
adjoining counties created logistic problems; few Menominee had
cars reliable enough to make the long trip to the doctors. The tribe
ended up contracting with an ambulance service, at a substantial
cost, to transport these members. Many Menominee were not suf-
ficiently acculturated to feel comfortable seeking help in the non-
Indian communities. They feared discrimination; they did not
think the white man's medicine was sufficiently sensitive to the im-
portant role Indian culture played in shaping the Indian's percep-
tion of his medical needs. Because of the cost, the distance, and the
fear, many Menominee did not seek medical treatment."'
The Menominee were not a people whose health could with-
stand the lack of care. Soon after termination, a tuberculosis
epidemic swept the reservation. In a pilot testing program of coun-
ty employees,"' it was found that one-third of those Menominee
tested had the disease. In a later test, more than 25 per cent of the
Menominee reacted postively. Although at least 20 per cent need-
ed drug treatment, not all of them received it. "1 In like manner, the
Menominee suffered, at a disproportionate rate, from other
diseases. "'
The lack of on-reservation health care had a devastating impact
on the physical well-being of the Menominee.
The closing of the hospital also had a detrimental impact on the
tribe's psychological well-being. The communally owned hospital
had been an important social and cultural center-an institution
for which no post-termination equivalent was to be found. Many
poor Menominee had used the building as a shelter from the harsh
cold of the Wisconsin winters; they were made to feel welcome
and no stigma was attached to the use of the hospital for this pur-
pose. The hospital served as a convalescent or short-term nursing
home for the older Menominee. A meeting place for many, the
145. For a more complete discussion, see RAY, FREEDOM, supra note 126, at 41-45.
146. It can be assumed that these employees, whose incomes and standards of living
were higher than those of most of their brethren, were healthier than other Menominee.
147. In the first year after termination, the Menominee spent more than $80,000 fighting
tuberculosis; subsequent years required equivalent expenditures. ORFIELD, supra note 12, at
ch. 6, p. 17. See also 1966 Report, supra note 130, at 31-32.
148. In 1965 the reported rate of heart disease, stroke, cancer, influenza, pneumonia,
diabetes, and diseases of early infancy was much greater than that of the communities sur-
rounding the reservation. See 1966 Report, supra note 130, at 29.
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hospital was described as "a friendly place where people looked
out for each other. When people were asked about their stays in
the hospital and their friendships with the doctors and nurses who
worked there, many warm memories were kindled.'.. The loss of
the hospital was felt deeply.'"
Forced to sell their utility plants, the Menominee lost control
over the production and delivery of power and water on the reser-
vation. This brought about a further decline in the tribe's standard
of living; few other American families, in the 1960's, had to
relearn how to live without electricity. Before termination the
tribe owned and operated three power plants. Each Menominee
household received free electricity and water. Not regulated by the
federal government, and exempt from state control, the plants
were never licensed. Termination would end the exemption. To
conform with the state's standards, the Menominee would have
had to spend at least $40,000 on physical plant improvements.''
Had they the money to make these changes, they still could not
have complied with two other state regulations: utility companies
had to post a sizeable cash bond, and Wisconsin prohibited the
operation of a utility company at a financial loss."2 To make the
improvements, to post the bond, and to operate at a profit, the
small-scale Menominee power companies would have had to
charge very high rates. In the face of this reality, the Menominee
sold their power plants to the Wisconsin Power and Light Com-
pany. In addition to $75,000, the tribe received the company's
promise to deliver power at a rate lower than that at which the
tribe could have provided it. The transaction caused a bitter con-
flict among the Menominee. One of the first sales of communally
held property, many Menominee strongly opposed the loss of
tribal control over an essential service.' 3 Their fears were later
confirmed. Many Menominee were not able to pay their power
bills. The private power company discontinued their service.
Once a relic, the kerosene lamp became a fixture in many
Menominee homes."'
149. RAY, FREEDOM, supra note 126, at 43.
150. The magnitude of the symbolic loss was made greater by the conversion of the
hospital building into a county courthouse, from which state law and order was dispensed.
151. 1966 Report, supra note 130, at 24.
152. ORFIELD, supra note 12, at ch. 6, p. 13.
153. Id.
154. General Economic Situation of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, BIA, A
REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS & THE HOUSE INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS
COMM. 14 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BIA REPORT). In a like manner, other services provid-
ed by the tribe were threatened by state regulation. The tribe had to renovate its sewage
system. The water system required improvements. Finally, when faced with state control,
the once flexible Menominee loan fund [see Herzberg, supra note 1, at 2961 played a less
meaningful role in tribal life.
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One of the central assumptions that dominated the rhetoric of
the bureaucrats and congressmen who supported the termination
of the Menominee was that the tribe's lumber industry would pro-
vide an economic base capable of supporting both individual
Menominee and a new, reservation-based county. ' There was no
factual support for this assumption. That it was without merit
became clear soon after the withdrawal program took effect. Forced
to comply with state regulations, taxed on its income and proper-
ty, and placed in a highly competitive market in which it was asked
to turn a profit, the mill foundered and threw the tribe and the
county into a period of economic chaos.
A pretermination inspection of the 50-year-old mill disclosed
132 violations of state codes. ' Even though it knew that the mill
was to be the cornerstone of the terminated tribe's economy, the
Bureau did not act to correct the deficiencies. After termination,
the tribe spent more than $100,000... to make the mill eligible for a
license. The Menominee soon found that it took more than an im-
proved physical plant to guarantee success.
Serious management and personnel problems prevented a suc-
cessful transition into the post-termination, competitive market.
After many years of Bureau paternalism in which few Menominee
received either the education or the experience necessary to
qualify for the positions directing mill operations,' the tribe was
forced to hire new managers to replace the departing Bureau
employees who had governed the business. ' The first president
was a part of a management group hired away from a large,
western mill. The new managers tried, unsuccessfully, to adapt
western methods to the small-scale, tribal industry. For example,
they placed a high priority on the efficient transport of cut logs
from the forest to the mill. As they had in the west, they purchased
several expensive, large trucks to replace the smaller ones the tribe
155. In 1947, Commissioner Zimmerman first proposed the withdrawal program. In
establishing criteria to determine the tribe's readiness for termination, he looked to its
economic condition. The Commissioner was certain that the tribe's economy, without
federal support, would allow the Menominee to attain a decent standard of living. See
Herzber,, supra note 1, at 303. However, his conclusion was based on conjecture, not
fact. Id. at 308. The same assumptions about the viability of the Menominee economy were
made during the Menominee termination hearings. Once more, no facts were introduced to
support the congressmen's conclusions. For a discussion of the Menominee termination
hearings, see id. at 321.
156. RAY, MENOMINEE TRIBE, supra note 126, at 92.
157. 1966 Report, supra note 130, at 23.
158. SeeHerzberg, supra note 1, at 297.
159. In the ten years following termination, the enterprise had six presidents; only one
was a Menominee. BIA REPORT, supra note 154, at 38.
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had been using. It was not until after the new trucks were
delivered that the managers found that they were too wide for the
reservation roads. Undaunted, they had the roads widened. But
the trucks still could not be used; when loaded to near capacity,
they were so heavy they sank into the roads. Similar attempts at
innovation failed.'" Not able to improve the efficiency of the
operation with physical changes, the management attempted to
increase the productivity of -the work force. This significantly
changed the role the mill had played in the reservation economy.
Once run as a quasi-public service, to maximize employment, the
new operation was run like any other private business, to max-
imize profit."' Orfield describes the change:
The new president felt that the creation of an effective
business operation required a revolution in Menominee at-
titudes and procedures. There had been no cost control
system, but now an accountant was employed. New methods
were adopted and a strenuous effort was made to persuade
long-experienced workers to change their procedures. Those
who "couldn't adjust" were replaced. The feeling of tribal
members that the mill owed them a job was attacked by a
policy of tough management, firing for infringements which
would have been tolerated without comment in the past.1
,2
Even with the tough new management and personnel policies, the
mill operation could not generate a high enough profit to carry the
burdens that were placed upon it.
The new enterprise entered and had to compete in an unstable,
depressed market. During the termination hearings, it was assumed
that the high demand market of the early 1950's would continue.
The assumption was wrong. By 1958, there was a sharp decline in
the demand for the mill's products. To make matters worse, the
mill had accumulated a huge inventory; production cutbacks,
with an attendant cutback in the labor force followed. During its
160. A decision was made to adopt the western method of measuring lumber by its
weight rather than its dimensions. When it was found that the system encouraged the
transport of useless material to the mill, the old system was reinstated.
161. Just six weeks before termination became effective the mill management laid off
one-third of the mill workers. Id. at 10.
162. ORFIELD, supra note 12, at ch. 6, p. 11.
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first three years, the Menominee enterprise-a business that had
always been profitable-ran in the red."" As the mill failed, so
sank the hopes and plans for Menominee prosperity.
The hopes and plans for prosperity were not realized because
they were built upon an inaccurate assumption-that the
Menominee, who had, in essence, paid for the federal and state
services on the reservation, would be able to provide those ser-
vices, without assistance, after termination. It soon became clear
that this would not be the case. The tribe could not balance its
first, post-termination budget. Even with the elimination of
several costly services for which the tribe had paid (health care,
utility service, and education), the projected expenses totaled
more than $600,000.64 This required a budget 50 per cent greater
than that of the previous year.'65 The Menominee were boxed in by
spending requirements they could not control; a large portion of
this budget was not to be directed toward the provision of essen-
tial services, but rather, was to be used to make the physical im-
provements of the tribe's facilities that have been discussed earlier.
For the first time, the Menominee had to institute a county tax
system to garner the revenue needed for these expenditures.'
Menominee Enterprises, Inc., which held 90 per cent of the
reservation's taxable property,"' could not carry the heavy tax
burden."' The mill, the reservation's principal business, stood out,
a lonely target for the tax collector. However, the mill's projected
earnings for the first year after termination were but $240,000,"' a
sum clearly insufficient to generate the tax income the budget re-
quired. Few thought it would meet the projection. When it did
not, its failure was felt by both the county and its employees, both
of whom were depending upon it for support. In the end, the
budget was balanced and the services provided, but only with the
assistance of the federal and state governments.'7" A cycle was
started; as the county failed to support itself, the Menominee had
163. The mill was run at a loss until 1965. During that year and the five that followed,
net earnings increased to the point of showing a net profit. However, in at least three of
those years the profit came from the sale of reservation land, not the sale of mill products.
BIA REPORT, supra note 154, at 5.
164. ORFIELD, supra note 12, at ch. 6, p. 4.
165. [d. at 10.
166. As a tribe, the Menominee had never exercised their taxing power. Herzberg, supra
note 1, at 296.
167. ORFIELD, supra note 12, at ch. 6, p. 10.
168. To compound the burden, the county was forced to use a tax rate that approached
the maximum allowed by state law.
169. ORFIELD, supra note 12, at ch. 6, p. 10.
170. Id. at 17.
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to turn to the state and federal governments for help. The terinina-
tion goal of an independent, self-sustaining tribe was never to be
achieved.
Perhaps more than any other factor, the lack of reservation
employment opportunities led to the sharp decline in the quality
of Menominee life. After termination, the mill ceased to be the
employer of last resort; there were no sure sources of reservation
jobs. In fact, the mill, the reservation's major employer, was lay-
ing off people. From 1954 to 1964, the number of reservation jobs
decreased.' 7 ' Moreover, the Menominee did not fare well in the
competition for jobs in the neighboring- communities. The
statistics for the period clearly set forth-a rate of unemployment
disproportionate to that of the entire state.'72 Spokeswoman Ada
Deer best gave meaning to those numbers when she testified about
the impact the high unemployment rate was having on the
Menominee:
Let us tell you about our people's far-reaching poverty,
which extends beyond mere income levels to practically all
other areas of our life.
Today, Menominee County is the poorest county in
Wisconsin. It has the highest birthrate in the state and ranks
at or near the bottom of Wisconsin counties in income, hous-
ing, property value, education, employment, sanitation and
health. The most recent figures available (1967) show that the
annual income of nearly 80 percent of our families falls below
the federal poverty level of $3,000. The per capita annual in-
come of our wage earners in 1965 was estimated at $881, the
lowest in the state.
Our county does not have diversified industry. Over 70
percent of those employed work in our MEI lumber industry.
In 1968, 24.4 percent of our people were unemployed, the
highest unemployment rate in the state.
This lack of employment opportunities, combined with
our high birthrate, forced nearly 50 percent of our county
171. RAY, MENOMINEE TRIBE, supra note 126, at 71.
172. For example, in 1963, the unemployment rate in Menominee county was 13.6%;
the corresponding statewide rate was 4.0%. In 1964, the rates were 18.1% and 3.7%. In
1972, they were 25.7% and 5.2%. See 1966 Report, supra note 130, at 29; BIA REPORT,
supra note 154, at 29. In addition, the incomes of the large Menominee families were lower
than those of the smaller, non-Indian families in the state. In 1970, the per capita income for
Menominee was $1,028; the average state per capita income was $3,158. In a ten-year
period, the median income had risen but $377. See RAY, MENOMINEE TRIBE, supra note 126,
at 91; BIA REPORT, supra note 154, at 29.
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residents to go on welfare in 1968. Welfare costs in the coun-
ty for 1968 were over $766,000 and our per capita welfare
payment was the highest in the state. The majority of
Menominee who have left our county to seek work in the
cities have become trapped in poverty there also.'
7
1
The unemployed Menominee were forced to turn to the welfare
system for their support. A once self-sufficient people, they were
made to depend on a government that, in terminating them, had
rhetorically promised to free them. 74
As the post-termination years passed, both the individual
Menominee and the county became dependent on the assistance
provided by the federal and state governments. In 1954, its first
year, Menominee County was declared a depressed area and,
thereby, made eligible for federal assistance. M The Menominee
had not needed this help before. In 1953, they had paid the federal
government for all but $59,000 of their reservation expenses. '7' But
with termination, this changed. From June 17, 1954, to June 27,
1973, the Menominee and the county received more than
$20,000,000 in federal and state aid." A great deal of this went to
individual families in the form of welfare payments."'7 As had been
promised, termination had freed the Menominee from the ward
status that accompanied the trust supervision of the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs. However, in the Bureau's place a new group of
quas-trustees- the caseworkers-emerged. Often less knowledge-
able about and less sensitive to Indian culture than the Bureau
people they replaced,' 7 the caseworkers intervened to play a
significant role in Menominee life. As was the case with other poor
173. Hearings on S. C.R. 26 Before the Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess 119 (1971) 1hereinafter cited as Hearings on S.C.R. 261.
174. When in public, the proponents of the withdrawal programs dropped their coercive
tactics and used the freedom rhetoric extensively. SeeHerzberg, supra note 1, at 319.
175. 1966 Report, supra note 130, at 23.
176. 119 CONG. REc. 34302 (1973).
177. Report of the Department of the Interior on H.R. 7421, sent by letter dated June 27,
1973, at p. 2.
178. In 1954, 14% of the Menominee received some form of aid as compared to 2.6% of
all Wisconsin residents, RAY, FREEDOM, supra note 126, at 90. As previously mentioned, the
Menominee paid for the aid to their people. By 1968, 46% of the Menominee were receiving
aid, id. at 37. A great portion of this was paid by the county which, in order to raise the
revenue, was forced to use the highest mill rate of any county in the state, id. at 90. From
1961 the number of Menominee receiving aid increased 95% while the number of other
Wisconsin residents decreased 10.4%. During that same period, the amount spent on
Menominee welfare increased 19 while that spent on other state residents increased but
10.5%. 1966 Report, supra note 130, at 34.
179. RAY, FREEDOM, supra note 126, at 39.
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Americans, the Menominee lost the promise of their freedom in
the policies and procedures that fostered their dependence on the
welfare bureaucracy.
Many of the Menominee who were receiving state aid learned a
tough economic lesson when they found that to qualify for aid,
they were forced to give up the only asset they had obtained from
the dissolution of the tribe's communal holdings-their
Menominee Enterprises income bonds. To be eligible for aid, a
Wisconsin resident had to show that he was in need and that he
held no more than $750 worth of liquid or negotiable assets."'
Because the discounted bonds were found to be worth $1,200, the
Menominee families that held them did rot qualify for assistance.
For two years, many Menominee tried-to sell the bonds on the
open market; the market was not predictable and the bonds were
often sold for but a fraction of their value. In 1963, the state
legislature addressed the problem. However, instead of making
the bonds exempt from the property limitation, the legislature
took a tack that ultimately led to the state's ownership of many of
the bonds. By the new law, a Menominee bondholder who applied
for aid had two choices. He could either assign the bond to the
state, or he could post it with the state as collateral for a loan. In
either case, once he received $3,000 in aid, the state became the
owner of the bond.'"' By 1969, the state owned $1,030,931 worth
of bonds and held another $218,290 worth of assigned bonds.' - A
group of outraged Menominee organized and formed the
Menominee County Welfare Rights Organization, which lobbied
to repeal the law. They were successful. In 1971, the Department
of Health and Social Services ordered an end to the state's taking
of Menominee bonds.' 3 Statutes were later passed which ended the
practice and returned the bonds to their original owners.' During
the period in which the state held the bonds, the Menominee were
not only deprived of the interest paid on them, but they also suf-
fered the loss of a symbolic tie to their traditional pattern of com-
munal ownership.
180. The $750 limit was applied to those Menominee seeking Old-Age Assistance [Wis.
Regs. -Eligibility for Old -Age Assistance, § 49.20 (11-1-68)]. For those seeking Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, the limit was $500. [Wis. Regs.-Eligibility for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, § 49.19 (10-22-68)].
181. WIs. STARS § 49.70(2) (1963).
182. 1969 Report, bupra note 130, at 28.
183. The Department's order was issued at the request of Governor Patrick J. Lucey,
who had previously promised the Menominee that he would end the bond assignments.
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Before termination, the Menominee shared one strong tie to
their culture and tradition-the practice of holding tribal land in
common. This tie, the product of the tribe's strong, successful
resistance to the white man's many attempts to take the
Menominee land, was broken by termination. The impact was felt
deeply by the Menominee, both individually and as a tribe. '
Termination forced the Menominee to implement a system of
individual land ownership and title that had been foreign to their
culture and tradition. For centuries, individual Menominee had
built their homes and lived on land communally owned by the
tribe. Blamed for the "slow development" of Indian commerce and
enterprise, and later attacked as "communistic," this practice was
never popular with the government.'" Over the years, many tribes
succumbed to the government's pressure and rhetoric and switched
from the system of communal ownership to one of individual title.
The Menominee did not. But after termination they could resist no
longer. The Menominee land was parceled and sold, both to the
Indians who had lived on it and to outsiders.
The system of individual ownership was not easily im-
plemented. Actually, neither the termination act nor the tribe's
termination plan dealt with the problem of land ownership.
Although individual ownership was an implied goal of termina-
tion, the law did not require it. ' The plan placed the land, along
with the tribe's other communally held assets, under the control of
Menominee Enterprises, Inc. It was the corporate board of direc-
tors that made the decision to parcel and sell it. The board ruled
that all land that was being used for housing be appraised and of-
fered for sale to its occupants. To preserve their family homes, the
Menominee had to buy the land they had been living on from
184. The assignments were formally ended by ch. 302, 1971 Wis. Laws 1169. Another
section, ch. 303, 1971 Wis. Laws 1169, directed the Department to return the bonds it held
to their original owners. But, many of the bonds that were held by private interests were
never returned. For a discussion of how these bonds fell into private hands, see Report to
the Menominee Indian Study Committee on the Menominee Enterprises Inc. 4% Income
Bonds (1971).
185. The Menominee were but one of a very few tribes to retain a sizeable portion of
their aboriginal lands. Although they gave up a great deal of land in a series of treaties, they
later refused to relocate and would not participate in the allotment program that ultimately
led to white ownership of a sizeable portion of Indian lands. Herzberg, supra note 1, at 279-
83.
186. Id. at 279-302.
187. The terminated Klamath were given an option; they could either take an individual
share of the tribe's assets, or have their share communally managed by the government.
The majority of those who took individual shares soon lost them, while those who held
them communally remained in the traditional wardship that termination was supposed to
end. Id. at 310, 311.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss1/4
Menominee Enterprises. The land was appraised at its fair market
value. A good deal of it was so beautiful that it could command a
high price on the recreational use market; the prices at which it
was offered were often so high as to be beyond the realistic reach
of its occupants. To preserve their housing, families pledged their
one asset, the income bond, but without jobs, many soon
defaulted on their loans. To make matters worse, the land was no
longer exempt from taxation. With the county assessing at the
maximum rate allowed by state law, hundreds of families failed to
pay their tax bills and faced the loss of their houses.' Housing
became a critical problem for the terminated Menominee.' °
When it became clear that the mill could support neither the
Menominee people nor the county, the directors of Menominee
Enterprises, in an attempt to generate income and expand the tax
base, turned to the exploitation of the tribe's most cherished
assets-the reservation land and water."'0 Limited by a provision
in the termination plan that allowed it to lease but not sell the
land, the board, in 1962, began a program of recreational land
leases. However, when the program failed to generate the funds
necessary for the expansion and diversification of tribal industry,
the board asked the firm of Ernst and Ernst to prepare an
economic development plan. The plan proposed the sale of recrea-
tional land sites. Because it called for the sale of land, the plan had
to be approved by the Menominee. At one meeting, of the 253
Menominee stockholders who attended, 156 voted to follow the
plan while 97 opposed it. It is not clear that the voters understood
that they were approving land sales. Many thought they were ap-
proving, in principle, economic development. Few understood
that they were voting to allow the sale of tribal land to outsiders."'
188. ORFIELD, supra note 12, at ch. 6, pp. 11, 12, 15; Deer, Testimony, Hearings on
S.C.R. 26, supra note 173, at 14, 23.
189. The housing the Menominee were fighting to preserve was critically substandard.
The average value per house was $4,000. Less than one-third were sound; most were
deteriorating and dilapidated. To magnify the problem, the Menominee had large families;
there were half again as many people living in their houses than lived in the average
Wisconsin household. RAY, MENOMINEE TRIBE, supra note 126, at 89.
190. For a thorough discussion of the Legend Lake project and the machinations of the
voting trust, see RAY, FREEDOM, supra note 126, which contains the following statement of
the importance of land to the tribe: "To the Menominee, land is the center of their ex-
istence. The nature of the land determines how they live. In short, their land provides their
very identity." Id. at 34.
191. Id. at 29. "The Menominee had no idea the economic development zone would
degenerate into a mass sell-out of their land! They heard talk of 'warranty deeds' by their
Directors, but this term was not adequately explained. After the damage was done, they
were all to realize that issuing a 'warranty deed' allowed the corporation to sell the
Menominees' land."
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Actually, in order to protect the tribe from the pressures that
might lead to a hasty sale, the Menominee Enterprises articles of
incorporation specified that the corporation had to obtain the
votes of the "holders of not less than two-thirds of the outstanding
shares of stock entitled to vote" before it could sell land. This
possible obstacle to the sales was eliminated by the voting trustees
who, once they interpreted it to require a vote of the trustees, not
the shareholders, voted to proceed with the plan.
With this questionable authorization in hand, the board entered
an agreement with a developer who had become well known for
his exploitation of scenic lands and water. The agreement called
for the creation of a large, artificial lake, and the sale of 2,600
recreational building sites. Small lakes were flooded and enlarged.
Wetlands and hills disappeared.' 2 As the lots were sold to out-
siders, the Menominee lost the use of their land. "3
Had the plan succeeded, some may have argued that it was
worth the costs. But it failed, and its failure was predictable.
Although the land sales generated some revenue and expanded the
tax base, they also created a county liability to provide services.
The Menominee were caught by Catch 22. To provide services,
they had to sell land; the sale of land created a new obligation to
provide services. After years of failure, the partnership was
dissolved and the sales terminated. But, to this day, thousands of
acres of Menominee land are owned by outsiders.
192. For a description of the ecological damage done by the project, see id. at 33, which
contains the following; "[Tihe project destroyed a wild and beautiful area of Menominee
County, dotted with lakes and marshes and swarming with wildlife, and replaced it with a
large artificial lake system replete with noise, motorboat pollution, and other environmen-
tal abuses caused by concentrations of several thousands of people."
193 Id. at 6. "Some White people chased me away from my hunting lands. One guy
asked me what I was doing there, and I said, 'You got some nerve. This is my land.' The
man said, 'You talk pretty good.' And I replied, 'Oh sure, I went to school at least a couple
years. Any more questions you want to ask me?'. Before termination, many Menominee
exercised their hunting and fishing rights to feed their families. After termination, these
rights were protected from state regulation only after extensive, costly litigation. See
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). The developers failed to
respect the land and the Menominee values it symbolized. For example, "There was once a
fireplace on what is now called Legend Lake, that Menominees have known for at least 800
years. An archeologist came here to study it a few years back and collected sacs I sic] full of
pottery to carbon test how old the site was. He told me how valuable the site was, and I
told him we Menominee knew it. That fireplace was burning all day and all night, 365 days
of the year for people traveling by the reservation. Sort of what you folks call a 'motel'
these clays. The archeologist also pointed to an Indian burial mound nearby and told us we
should mark it off, so people would know it's a sacred and important historical place. I
thought it was a good idea too, but before I could do anything about it, the man came in
and bulldozed the whole thing. Can you believe it? He didn't ask anyone about the land he
was destroying. He just went ahead and bulldozed it." Id.
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Some of the termination losses which had the greatest impact on
the Menominee cannot be quantified; although intangible, they
are no less deeply felt. They are the product of the government's
success in achieving one of its major termination goals-the forced
assimilation of the Indian into the predominant white culture. In
the struggle to survive termination, the Menominee lost some
sense of identity, culture, and cohesion, some of the control over
their lives that is usually exercised by a free people, and thereby
suffered some of the frustrations of a people forced by an external
power to change to a foreign lifestyle.
The termination policy was an open attack on "Indianness"; in
many ways, it succeeded. Its first victims were those Menominee
children born after June 17, 1954, the day the tribal rolls were of-
ficially closed; they lost their paper status as Indians. ' Other ter-
mination pressures diminished the remnants of the traditional
lifestyle and values. Communal ownership of tribal assets was
ended. The tribe ceased to be the focus of reservation life; it was
no longer the source of jobs, services, and sustenance. In its place
appeared laws, a bureaucracy, and a way of life few Menominee
wanted. Some Menominee, often the young, unable to find work
and unwilling to face a life of dependence on state and federal
assistance, left the reservation.' °5 With them left some of the hope
for the continuation of a life guided by tribal tradition and molded
by Menominee values.
Rather than emancipate the Menominee, termination deprived
them of the opportunity to control their own lives. It made them
the wards of many masters-a county government with which
they could not identify, a welfare bureaucracy, and a corporate
structure that isolated them from the decision-making power. Few
Menominee participated in the formal county government that
replaced the General Council. Government welfare workers often
194. Herzberg, supra note 1, at 323.
195. The impact of the termination act on the Menominee young was described by
Menominee Alfred Pyatskowit, in his testimony in support of the Restoration Act. "[Ilden-
tification as members of the Menominee Indian Tribe has diminished to the point of nonex-
istence among many of the young people. Many realize that they are American Indian, but
the termination act has left them with a loss of identification as recognized members of the
Menominee Indian Tribe because they happened to be born after the closing of the official
roll. Subsequently, a form of cultural shock has taken place and has left these young people
in a void that may never be filled for them." Hearings on H.R. 7421 Before the Subcomm.
on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 93-20, at 115 (1973). Even though the Menominee birthrate was high, from 1960 until
1970, the reservation area population increased by but one person. BIA REPORT, supra note
154, at 18.
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had more power over the lives of the individual Menominee than
had the Bureau employees that they replaced. But, it was in the
management of Menominee Enterprises, Inc., which controlled
the tribe's assets, that the exclusion from power was most blatant
and meaningful. The Menominee found the voting trust that con-
trolled the corporation inaccessible and beyond their control. Few
believe that the tribe would have supported the trustees' decision
to sell Menominee land.' The Menominee did not willingly accept
the dominance of the trustees. When an election was held to
dissolve the trust, a well-organized majority of the Menominee
voted to do so. However, their efforts were frustrated when a
trustee, voting the shares of the First Wisconsin Assistance Trust
as a block, did so in favor of continuing the trust."7 It was not a
total defeat. In this grassroots campaign were sown the seeds of a
movement to return the tribe to its pretermination status, seeds
which, when nurtured by the energy of many Menominee, bore
the fruit of victory-restoration.
(Part II of this article by Professor Herzberg will be published in
the next issue of the American Indian Law Review, Volume VI,
Number 2.- Ed. Note)
196. The Menominee were strongly opposed to the land sales; the only support came
from the small elite-acculturated faction which dominated the tribe's political processes.
ABERI.E & BROPHY, supra note 74, at 197.
197. The loss of control over tribal life had a negative impact on Menominee morale. In
a "confidential" memorandum, Assistant Attorney General John Bowers stated: "Without
exception, every single individual spoken to in Menominee County stated that the morale
on the Reservation is the lowest that it has ever been in the memory of the individuals
spoken to. Some of these people have lived on the Reservation for 35 or 40 years and they
all say that the morale is very, very low-lower than it has ever been. Generally speaking,
the people are fearful of the Corporation; they are fearful of the Corporation management;
they do not have any confidence in the Board of Directors or the voting trustees, and iden-
tify each of these groups with management, without exception and voluntarily without
prompting by questioning the individuals stated that they felt appeals to the Board of
Directors or the voting trustees were useless because they were merely appealing to
management. Two Indian members of the Board of Directors are not managing the Cor-
poration and they are merely a rubber stamp for the managers .... RAY, MENOMINLE
TRIBE supra note 126, at 85.
The creation of the First Wisconsin Assistance Trust was an insult to the Menominee that
proved false the freedom rhetoric of the termination proponents. Although under Wiscon-
sin law parents or relatives usually held the shares of incompetents or minors in trust, these
shares were placed under the control of a corporate trust department. No hearings were
held to declare adult Menominee incompetent, or to show that the shares would not be pro-
perly managed by a family trustee; they were automatically assigned to the bank. At the
beginning of the termination period, the bank held, and voted as a block, nearly 41 per cent
of the Menominee shares. Needless to say, the bank held a disproportionate share of the
power over Menominee affairs. For discussions of the tribe's battle to regain control over its
assets, see Otradovec v. First Wisconsin Trust Co., 454 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1972): RM'r,
FREED DM, supra note 126, at 67 etseq.
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